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RECENT CASES
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS-
THRESHOLD APPLICATION OF COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING UNDER NEPA
The Sierra Club and other organizations interested in protection
of the environment' brought suit in federal district court alleging
that the Departments of the Interior and Agriculture, along with the
Army Corps of Engineers, were violating the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA) of 19692 in allowing coal development in the
Northern Great Plains region . The specific charge was that the
federal defendants4  had failed to prepare a detailed, comprehen-
sive environmental impact statement for the region, a systematic in-
terdisciplinary study of coal development, and a study of appropriate
alternative courses of action 5 prior to allowing development in the
four-state region. The plaintiffs prayed for declaratory relief from
the alleged violations, an injunction barring further federal action
in the region until compliance with NEPA's provisions, and an order
compelling the federal defendants to abide by NEPA's require-
ments.6 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
1. The Court of Appeals found that among the plaintiff organizations only the Northern
Plains Resource Council had standing to sue since no other plaintiff introduced any evi-
dence on the issue of standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 869-70 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1975). See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPAl.
3. The states included within the Northern Great Plains region in issue were North
Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. Brief for appellant at 33, Sierra Club v.
Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
4. Sixteen coal mining companies and utility companies joined with the Crow Tribe
of Indians to intervene after a showing of their respective interests In coal development.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. A pertinent part of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970), provides:
[A]I agencies of the Federal Government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will Insure the
Integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental
design arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an Impact
on man's environment;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be impemented'.
Prior to make any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has juris-
diction by law or special expertise with respect to the environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the apropri-
ate Federal, State, and local agencies,, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President,
the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by sec-
tion 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing
agency review processes;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts con-
cerning alternative uses of available resources.
6. In deciding whether or not an injunction should issue in NEPA cases, the harm to
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bia Circuit held that when the federal government attempts to "con-
trol development" of a definite region by using it power to approve
coal leases, mining plans, rights-of-way, and water option contracts,
it is -engaged in a comprehensive major federal action within the
meaning of NEPA, and therefore must prepare a comprehensive en-
vironmental impact statement.7 The court further noted that when
a federal agency chooses not to officially label its attempts at con-
trol of coal-related development a "plan" or a "program," it is
no bar to the agency's duty to prepare an environmental impact
statement for "major federal actions significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment. . . ."S However, the court also held
that since the major federal action was merely "contemplated" by
the agencies, an order would issue simply compelling the federal de-
fendants: to make the initial decision whether or not to prepare a
comprehensive environmental impact statement for the Northern
Great Plains and to provide a statement of reasons for the deci-
tion.9 Sierra Club v. Morton, 514-F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).10
Since NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970, it has been
the vehicle for a large volume of environmental litigation which has
sought to articulate the national demand for environmental protec-
tion."' Two of the earliest decisions gave the Act a very constricted
reading, under the mistaken belief that it created no judicially en-
forceable rights or duties in federal agencies. 1 2 However, the trend
established has been to interpret NEPA to require federal agencies
to consider environmental values "to the fullest extent possible,'
'1 3
rather than to allow them to consider only those values peculiar to
the agency's expertise.
To ensure that the broad substantive policies expressed in NEPA 4
be enjoined is sufficiently mature at the time an environmental impact statement becomes
necessary, but is not filed. Jones v. District of Col. Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
7. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
8. Id., citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
9. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 882 nn.38 & 40 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
10. Cert. granted sub nom. Frizzell v. Sierra Club, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 8389 (U.S. Jan. 12,
1976) (No. 75-552), cert. granted sub nom. American Elec. Power Sys. v. Sierra Club,
44 U.S.L.W. 3389 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) (No. 75-561).
11. For 'an overview of the demand for environmental legislation and a discussion of
the legislative history of NEPA, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1-14 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON] ; 14. Yarrington, The National Environmental Policy Act,
4 B.N.A. ENVIRONMENT REPORTER MONOGRAPHs NO. 36 at 4-6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Yarrington]. See also ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 221-24 (Aug., 1972).
12. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); Buckleln v. Volpe, 2 E.R.C.
1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
13. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). See also Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486
F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973) ; Environmental Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th
Cir. 1972).
14. NEPA's 'substantive provisions, particularly 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(a) & (b), represent
a challenge to courts interpreting them because the language speaks in terms of general
policy. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that:
The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that
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are implemented by federal planners, certain action-forcing proce-
dures were included by Congress.15 In particular, federal agencies
are required to "include a detailed evnironmental impact statement
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislatilon and
other major federal actions .. ."I' To date, the courts have tended
to enforce and explain the procedural requirements, but the sub-
stantive meaning, while receiving a great deal of explanation, has
generally received a minimum of enforcement.1
7
The courts' preference for interpreting the procedural require-
ments derives from both the role of the courts as overseers of ad-
ministrative agencies 5 and the relative ease of ruling upon proce-
dural matters as questions of law. 9 When ruling upon questions of
fact which have been committed by statutes to agency expertise
and discretion, the judiciary i's keenly aware of the limited review
power it may exercise.
20
The evidence in Sierra Club v. Morton showed that the Secretary
of the Interior had recognized the applicability of NEPA's environ-
mental impact statement requirements to the region qua region, be-
cause he had initiated a number of studies of the Northern Great
Plains region, in addition to an inventory of coal resources. 21 One
study in particular, the Northern Great Plains Resource Program2
was an effort to coordinate ongoing federal activities and to build a
policy which might guide future resources decisions by agencies
in that area.22 In the Northern Great Plains Resource Program im-
plementing order from the Secretary to his staff in the interior De-
partment, the Secretary declared:
the Act Is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was In-
tended to effect substantive changes in decision making. § 4331(b) of the
Act states that agencies have an obligation "to use all practical means, con-
sistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to Improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs and resources to preserve and
enhance the environment". To this end, § 101 sets out specific environmental
goals to serve as a set of policies to guide agency action affecting the en-
vironment....
Environmental Def. Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972). For
further discussion of substantive duties imposed by NEPA upon the courts and agen-"cies, see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 258-65.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra. See also Yarrington, supra
note 11, at 4-6.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (c) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
17. See Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights Under NEPA, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES
LAWYER 387 (1974); Yarrington, supra note 11, at 37-40; Note, Threshold Determinations
Under Section 102(2)(c) of NEPA, 16 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 107, 108 (1974). Compare
Environmental Def. Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D.D.C. 1971) with Environ-
mental Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297 (8th Cir. 1972), In which
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that NEPA created substantive rights and Is
more than a full disclosure law.
18. I . DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 29.02, at 527, 30.03, at 548 (3Od ed. 1972).
19. Id. § 30.03, at 548.
20. Id., see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 258.
21. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
22. NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT (Washington,
D.C., and Denver, Colo., Sept. 27, 1974).
23. Id. at 1-4, I-5.
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The vast reserves of coal in the Fort Union region of Mont-
ana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming provide an
excellent opportunity for this Department to demonstrate how
a responsible Federal agency can manage resource develop-
ment with proper regard for environmental protection. It is
important that we not lose this opportunity by engaging in
single-purpose studies which are incapable of developing com-
prehensive information or by taking piecemeal actions which
restrict our future options.24
When the massive Draft Report of the Program was issued how-
ever, it contained the statement that "[t]he . . .coal development
profiles [within the Program] do not represent plans for develop-
ment .. "25 In comparing these statements, the court discerned an
inconsistency between the Interior Department's prior policy state-
ments and its later actions.
2 6
The Interior Department demonstrated further appreciation of
the practical effect that it continues to exert upon regional develop-
ment when it proclaimed a coal leasing moratorium pending comple-
tion of a national environmental impact statement on proposed fed-
eral coal leasing policies.2 1 Notwithstanding the moratorium, some
federal activity in the Northern Great Plains continued, either
through loopholes in the Interior Department's policy or through the
exercise of other agencies' jurisdiction over national forests and navi-
gable rivers.
28
In a footnote before reaching the merits, the court readily dis-
posed of two preliminary defenses raised by the defendant agencies.
29
First, the rule that a NEPA challenge against an individual pro-
ject presents a justiciable controversy only after final agency ap-
proval was found inappropirate in this case. The decision in Scien-
tist's Institute for Public Information v. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion,31 upon which the court relied, held that a comprehensive pro-
gram is itself a proper subject for challenge, regardless of whether
a program-related individual project has begun to significantly af-
24. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 863, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis added).
25. NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT, at I-5 (Sept. 27,
1974) (emphasis in original).
26. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
27. Id. at 863-64 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For a discussion of proposed amendments to the
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1970), and' an argument by former
Speaker of the House John McCormick that coal gasification will better serve the national
economy by relying on Eastern and Central states' coal reserves, see 121 CONG. REC. 14564
(daily ed. July 31, 1975).
28. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 864 nn.8-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court com-
mended the federal defendants for the amount of restraint they had demonstrated In
allowing development up to that time, but expressed its alarm at the variety of available
leasing loopholes and the increasing pressure for private development to begin immediately
upon completion of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program Final Report. Id. at 866
& 883.
29. Id. at 868 n.20.
50. See, e.g., Comm. to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972).
31. 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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fect the environment. 32 Similarly, in Sierra Club the plaintiffs were
held to have stated a case or controversy in alleging an irretrieva-
ble commitment of resources, a reasonable basis for treating such
commitments cumulatively, and a present requirement for filing a
comprehensive environmental impact statement. 3 Since NEPA ex-
pressly mandates preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment where any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of re-
sources is about to occur,3 4 plaintiffs' claim was deemed clearly
within the Act. Additionally the ruling in Calvert Cliff's Coordinat-
ing Committee v. Atomic Energy Commission,35 that NEPA's en-
forcement is a matter of judical jurisdiction, taken in conjunction
with the Scientist's Institute decision that courts must intervene
sufficiently early to prevent improper consideration of cumulative
impacts,3 6 provided the grounds necessary for immediate review.
The question of standing was resolved through the court's ap-
plication of the rather liberal criteria developed by the United States
Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton,3 the leading case on en-
vironmental plaintiffs' standing to sue. Under those criteria,,38  a
showing by one of the plaintiff organizations that it was composed
of residents from within a proposed mine site clearly demonstrated
that it would suffer at least minimal injury in fact if any member's
land was mined. 9 The plaintiffs' standing to sue was found to be
perfected since their immediate injury was within the zone of in-
terests which NEPA seeks to protect.
4 0
The threshold question posed by NEPA's impact statement re-
quirement is: when does a major federal action exist for the pur-
poses of the impact statement requirement?4 1 The case at bar is
S2. Id. at 1086-87.
33. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 869 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (v) (1970), quoted at length in note 5 supra.
35. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1972). In this case the
court held that NEPA's procedural requirements were enforceable on the merits. By way
of dictum, the court expressed its view that the substantive provisions are enforceable
also. Id. at 1111 & 1115.
36. Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
37. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).,See also United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) ; Scien-
tist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n.29 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
38. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738-40 (1972). The Court there held that aesthe-
tic, conservational, recreational, and economic interests may each suffer an Injury suffi-
cient to confer standing, but that the party in suit must itself suffer that injury. The
party's mere organizational interest is not sufficient, although once injury-in-fact is dem-
onstrated the injured party may then assert the public's interest In support of its claim
for equitable relief. Id. at 738-40 n.15.
39. See notes 1 & 33 supra.
40. See Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54, 157 (1970). NEPA
seeks to protect each person's interest In a healthful environment by diffusing or pre-
venting impacts from resource exploitation, population growth, and industrial expansion.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) & (c) (1970).
41. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F,2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908; cf.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974) ; Scherr v. Volpe,
466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972) ; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 367
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
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part of the attempt at judicial resolution of that question in the face
of federal agencies' prerogative to construct individual definitions of
the term. The initial judicial response to the federal agencies was
that an individual project could be "major," depending, for exam-
ple, on the degree of federal expenditure of time, money, or effort
which it received.4 2 The second stage of response was that the cu-
mulative effect of federal actions, individually too "minor" to re-
quire an impact statement, could cumulatively have an effect signi-
ficant enough to amount to a major federal action, therefore trig-
gering the requirement of a statement.4 3 The third response in the
progression was that the cumulative effect of a series of federal
actions which admittedly were individually major could require a
comprehensive environmental impact statement." The "comprehen-
sive" criterion was added to the second and' third responses because
the cumulative effect itself had a significant impact which was dis-
tinct from those of the individual acts, and because that impact
would not receive consideration in the -statements prepared for indi-
vidual actions. 45 Since the courts must implement consideration of
environmental values where the agencies fail to do so, the burden
.upon them is to ensure that foreseeable environmental impact is con-
sidered before a point of no return is reached in impractical, inex-
pedient use of our nation's resources.
4 6
The court in the present Sierra Club action looked to the prior
responses and viewed its threshold question to be whether its Scien-
tist's Institute ruling should be extended to require a comprehen-
sive environmental impact statement where the responsible federal
agency denies its involvement in an all inclusive program.4 7 The
court's view apparently places this case within the third level of res-
ponses to the broader threshold question of NEPA's application pre-
viously discussed.4 8 Scientist's Institute held that the impact state-
ment requirement directly applies to a comprehensive program which
is admittedly a major federal action.49 In Scientist's Institute, the
42. See Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972); Monroe County Conservation
Council v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972).
43. See Minnesota PIRG v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584 (D. Minn. 1973) ; Enewetak v. Laird,
853 F. Supp. 811 (D. Hawaii 1973) ; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972).
44. Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973). See also Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927
(2nd Cir. 1974) ; Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (1st Cir. 1973) ; Natural Res. Def. Council
V. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974).
45. See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 290-92.
46, [T~he harm with which courts must be concerned- in NEPA cases is not,
strictly speaking, harm to the environment, but rather the failure of decision-
makers to take environmental facts into account in the way that NEPA man-
dates.
Jones v. Dist. of Col. Redev. Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
47. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
48. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
49. 481 F.2d 1079, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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defendant Atomic Energy Commission had been receiving a large
annual appropriation for its nuclear research and development pro-
gram which was to site and construct a number of nuclear reactors.
The defendant Commission had also declared its intention to file an
environmental impact statement upon commencing construction of
each reactor, and thus had formally recognized NEPA's applicabil-
ity. The court found that the large federal appropriation alone made
the program sufficiently major, and that the public controversy about
the potential risks surrounding nuclear reactors showed an imminent
significant effect. Since the cumulative overlap of any environmental
effects produced by the reactors was not to be considered in any
phase of the program, the court ordered the defendant agency to
file a comprehensive environmental impact statement as a condition
precedent to continuing its program. 50
The federal defendants in the case at bar had prepared impact
statements for a few individual projects within the Northern Great
Plains, 5' but unlike the defendant in Scientist's Institute, they denied
any involvement in a comprehensive regional program. This fact
prompted the court to expressly reserve the right to probe the sub-
stance of the agencies' denial.52 The court's reservation was made
with reliance upon Conservation Society of Southern Vermont, Inc.
v. Secretary of Transportation.53 In that case, the court held that
the present improvement of a twenty mile stretch of U.S. highway
within the State of Vermont was an irretrievable commitment of re-
sources requiring preparation of a comprehensive impact state-
ment.5 4 The court found that federal expectations were to eventually
convert the improved stretch into a two-hundred-eighty mile inter-
state highway, as annual federal funding became available. In Con-
servation Society, as in the case at bar, the federal defendants had
no present plan which set forth. the full program in its entirety. If
such a plan had been clearly present in either case, then the re-
spective courts could have directly applied the impact statement re-
quirement. 5" Instead, those courts found that portions of the de facto
50. Id.
51. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 865 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1975). One of the Impact
statements prepared by the federal agencies involved in the suit had actually included
comprehensive consideration of four mine sites and two railroad routes within the Eastern
Powder River Basin in northeastern Wyoming. The close geogrdphical proximity of the
six developments and their cumulative environmental impact was the apparent constraint
In considering them at a somewhat regional level. Although this was not a point of con-
tention on review, the federal agencies seem to have practically conceded the question at
issue: whether a regional impact merits regional assessment by means of NEPA's Impact
statement provision. Id.
62. Id. at 874.
53. 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 935.
55. Both the Conservation Society and the Sierra Club courts took a hard look at the
facts presented to find that de facto programs existed. Were the programs formally de-
clared, they would manifestly have been "major federal actions" causing "irreversible
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-program which were about to be undertaken were irretrievably
committing resources. Also, the agencies -involved expected the full
program itself to become a major federal action of significant effect.
Thus, the remaining threshold question was whether the time was
ripe for preparing the comprehensive statement for the program. In
Conservation Society, ripeness was sufficient because enough high-
way routing decisions had occurred so that a definite proposal for
major federal action existed within NEPA's meaning.56
The unique question of ripeness arising in the present case was
whether a court could require the filing of a comprehensive envi-
ronmental impact statement "if it found that a comprehensive pro-
gram should be under way. 5 , 7 The court first looked to the Guide-
lines of the Council on Envoronmental Quality5 8 in responding to this
question. As a part of its functions, the Council is specifically directed
to issue guidelines for preparation of impact statements by federal
agencies.5, The Guidelines have been interpreted to require a degree
of deference from the courts since the Council is charged with ap-
praising agency compliance with NEPA and also because the Coun-
cil's interpretation of compliance was issued soon after NEPA's
enactment.60 The fact that the Guidelines specified coal develop-
ment as an example of cumulative impact upon a geographical re-
gion led the court to accept the plaintiff's theory that comprehen-
sive planning should be required of the agencies where cumulatively
related effects are shown.
6 1
But the court's final position was that the practical problems, of
imposing a duty to plan comprehensively upon agencies would en-
tangle the judiciary in the daily affairs of government and infringe
upon administrative discretion. The court thus held that it is for the
agencies to initially decide whether a comprehensive plan is required.
and Irretrievable commitments of resources," or, put differently, "major federal actions"
per se. In the context of long-range programs such as those discussed above . . . com-
pliance with NEPA is necessary at stages at which significant resources are
being committed lest the statute's basic purpose be thwarted.
Scientist's Inst. for Pub. Info. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1078, 1087 n.29 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).
56. Conservation Soc'y of S. Vermont v. Secretary of Trans., 508 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.
1974).
57. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (emphasis by the court).
58. Exec. Order No. 11,514, § 3(h), 3 C.F.R. 902 (1966-70 Comp.), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1970). For the full text of the Guidelines, see 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1974). The Council on
Environmental Quality was created by Title II of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970). Its
basic responsibility is to review and appraise agency compliance with NEPA. Id. at §
4344(3).
59. Id.
60. The doctrine of judicial deference to administrative interpretation Is enhanced In
this instance since Congress designated this particular agency, The Council of Environ-
mental Quality, to promote the statute's efficiency, and also because the Council was prob-
ably informed directly of the Congressional intent at the time the duty was created. See
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ; Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union
of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
61. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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It stated that "the agencies . . . are supposed to organize the various
federal projects throughout the country, not litigants .... ,,82 The role
of the court was ostensibly limited to deciding whether an agency
must file a regional environmental impact statement for a compre-
hensive plan which is in actual operation.6 3
The court's reluctance to intrude upon administrative jurisdic-
tion was tempered by its firm rejection of complete agency di'scre-
tion in deciding when an action is a "program. ' ' 64 This prompted
the court to leave open the possibility of imposing a duty to plan
comprehensively upon the agencies. 65 The power to require systema-
tic, interdisciplinary studies would allow the courts to reach ad-
ministrator's decisions during their formulation at the highest pol-
icy level. Such a power would thereby enable enforcement of envir-
onmental consideration to the fullest extent possible and greatly
strengthen NEPA's substantive sections.6
The overwhelming amount of federal time and effort which was
expended to produce a regional treatment of coal development in the
Northern Great Plains compelled the court to conclude that the re-
sulting "proposal" for regional development would require the pre-
sent filing of a comprehensive -impact statement.68 The court then
applied a balancing test for ripeness which it had developed in Scien-
tist's Institute,6 9 but found the test inconclusive because of the fed-
eral defendants' failure to define their long-term position in allowing
development.
Thie inconclusive result of the test is due principally to the fact
that the defendants acted inconsistently toward the Northern Great
Plains Region, and leaves the test's usefulness somewhat jeopar-
62. Id. at 875.
63. For a thorough discussion of "action" as a definitional tool which would trigger the
Impact statement requirement, thereby decreasing the uncertainty in timing and scope of
the statement, see Comment, Planning Level and Program Impact Statements Under the
National Environmdntal Policy Act: A Definitional Approach, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 124
(1975).
64. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court specified six
circuits holding that Injunctive relief is a proper remedy for substantive violations of
NEPA. Id. at 874 n.25.
65. Id. at 874.
66. For discussion of administrative decision-making generally and as applied to NEPA,
see ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 246-74; Cramton & Berg, On Leading a Horse to Water:
NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 Mica. L. REv. 511 (1973) ; Comment, NEPA Ap-
plied to Policy-Level Decisionmaking, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 799 (1974).
67. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
68. Id. at 875.
69. 481 F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1972). The agency, or the reviewing court, should inquire
as follows:
How likely Is the program to come to fruition, and how soon will that occur?
To what extent is meaningful information available on the efects of imple-
mentation of the program, and of alternatives and their effects?
To what extent are irretrievable commitments being made and options pre-
cluded as refinement of the proposal progresses?
How severe will be the environmental effects if the program is Implemented?
Id. at 880.
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dized. 70 The court found that meaningful information on the effects
of coal development and the alternatives to such development would
be available for consideration in a comprehensive statement. 71 Also,
it found that the environmental effects from coal development will
clearly be severe because "a region isolated from urban America,
sparsely populated and virtually unindustrialized will be converted
into a major industrial complex. ' ' 72 The further findings that the
federal government would probably approve development in the near
future, but that it was substantially avoiding irretrievable commit-
ments of coal and water until such approval, left the court with
mixed inclinations toward the ripeness issue. 73
Although the court found that the time was not yet ripe for a
comprehensive impact statement for coal development in the North-
ern Great Plains region, it did find that the federal defendants would
be free to approve further development in the region upon comple-
tion of the Northern Great Plains Resource Program Final Report.74
The court then correlated the agencies' freedom of action with a
duty to decide what their respecti've roles would be in relation to
NEPA. In so doing, it reinforced the degree of good faith compli-
ance with NEPA's procedure which the federal defendants had exhi-
bited through the leasing moratorium and the Northern Great Plains
Resource Program. To bolster further compilance, the court con-
70. See Comment, supra note 63, at 152. The author there states that the criteria bor-
rowed from Scientist's Institute merely invites bureaucratic obfuscation by allowing the
agencies to define their own role. But, the point made is that the federal duty to admin-
ister federal lands will Inevitably require the agencies to respond to increasing develop-
ment pressures by preparing a comprehensive plan as a result of systematic interdisciplinary
studies mandated by NEPA. Id.
71. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Interior Department
through Its Northern Great Plains Resource Program had, stated:
Considerable uncertainty remains regarding the impacts of coal development
In the Northern Great Plains. It is extremely difficult to estimate or assess
cumulative Impacts. However, these impacts may be critical. Is the impact
of two mines or power plants in the same area twice as great as the Im-
pact of one, or Is It larger?
NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCE PROGRAM, STAFF DRAFT REPORT at V-2 (Sept. 27, 1974).
Despite the seeming lack of answers to its questions in regard to air quality im-
pacts the Interior Department was already aware from its own previous North Central
Powers Study, that:
Once the proposed coal-burning power plants begin operation at their enor-
mous generating capacity, the region's air-quality-now almost pure and
containing little industrial pollution-will be seriously degraded. Based on an
operating capacity of only 53,000 megawatts-which may be only a portion
of their ultimate capacity-and upon full compliance with the New Stationary
Source Emission Standards of the Environmental Protection Agency, these
plans will produce annual emissions of 2,730,000 tons of sulfur oxides,
1,879,000 tons of nitrogen oxides and 94,500 tons of particulates (fly ash).
These amounts represent approximately four times the present combined
emissions of New York City and Los Angeles....
Brief for Appellants at 151-6, Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975), citing
North Central Power Study, City of New York Air Resources Department, and County of
Los Angeles Air Pollution Control District.
72. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73. Id. at 881.
74. Id.
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tinued the limited temporary injunction it had earlier issued."5 In-
junctive relief, the court noted, would preserve the status quo in that
portion of the region most immediately subject to irretrievable com-
mitment of its resources.
Sierra Club v. Morton is potentially a trend-setting case for a
number of reasons. Because of its broad application to inter-agency
actions which are linked either programatically, geographically, or
environmentally, the Sierra Club ruling may exert significant con-
straint upon such actions at the highest policy-making levels. The
ruling should implement systematic, inter-disciplinary studies of cu-
mulative impacts among agencies regardless of whether an agency
has originated an individual plan in the secullsion of its own bureau-
cracy. In the context of this case, a comprehensive environmental
impact statement should embrace the Northern Great Plains, and
should focus upon leasing, mining, rights-of-way, and water rights
in order to confront decision-makers with the full range of impacts
and alternatives. Such a confrontation is clearly needed to prevent
the easy, but fatally myopic, answers proposed in response to a
questionable energy crisis. 7G Ultimately, if a particular mine site is
chosen by this process, it should yield a long-term net benefit to the
region and to the nation, not merely the immediate landowner or
municipality. Such a choice will go far toward implementing NEPA's
substantive meaning and the most environmentally sound develop-
ment of natural resources.
GREG HENNESSY
75. Id. at 883.
76. In the field of electric utilities, the Environmental Protection Agency allows
those utilities to find low sulfur coal and then use no sulphur oxide scrubbing
devices to take the remaining sulphur out of the coal. And the result is that
utilities all over the country . . . are going to Montana and Wyoming to find
low sulphur coal so that they will not have to use technology to take out sul-
phur from coal as they must when using a higher sulphur-content coal.
Terris, Environmental Critique, 7 NATURAL REsouRcEs LAwYER 217. (1974).

